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Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing
Costs or Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation,
Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms
Cass R. Sunsteint
Is an accommodation "reasonable"under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct if
and only if the benefits are roughly proportionalto the costs? How should benefits and
costs be assessed? Should courts ask how much disabledemployees are willing to pay to
obtain the accommodation,or instead how much they would have to be paid to forego
the accommodation? How should stigmatic or expressive harms be valued? This Essay,
written for a celebration of the work of Judge RichardA. Posner,engages these questions in a discussion of an important opinion in which Judge Posner denied accommodations involving the lowering of a sink in a kitchenette and a requestfor telecommuting. The problem with Judge Posner's analysis is that it does not seriously investigate
either costs or benefits. A general lesson is that while cost-benefit balancing can helpfully discipline unreliable intuitions about the effects of requested accommodations, it
can also incorporatethose intuitions. Other lessons are that stigmatic harms and daily
humiliations deserve serious attention as part of the inquiry into whether requested
accommodations are reasonable,and that the removal of those harms and humiliations
can create real benefits Adequate cost-benefit analyses must attempt to measure and
include those benefits.

INTRODUCTION

Richard Posner has been a colleague and a friend for over a quarter century. Over the years, I have learned that there is one thing he
isn't: sentimental. A celebration of his years on the bench inevitably
invites not only sentimentality but also a lot of applause, and we
should certainly pause for some. (A terrible secret: those of us who
know Posner well like him. Actually, we like him a lot.') But for this
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of
Political Science, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Christine Jolls, with whom I taught the
case discussed here on two occasions; I have learned a great deal from her emphasis on expressive harms in particular. Thanks too to Sam Bagenstos, Elizabeth Emens, Robert Hahn, and
Sarah Lawsky for valuable comments on a previous draft.
1 A small story: in my first year at The University of Chicago Law School, I was invited to
a little dinner party at the house of Frank Easterbrook (not yet a federal judge). The party was
dominated by George Stigler, a Nobel Prize winner-to-be and a major figure at the University at
the time. Stigler asked me what I taught, and I responded that I taught Social Security and Welfare Law, at which point Stigler began to cast cheerful, contemptuous ridicule on the subject. In
Stigler's view, no one in America was poor, because even a little money ($7 a week, if memory
serves) could go a very long way. This position seemed to me not only preposterous but also
offensive, and I tried to respond; but Stigler was of course Stigler, and in addition to being a
terrific debater, he wasn't always a very nice man. Seeing my distress, Posner came to the rescue
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particular judge, I think, the best celebration is no mere celebration. I
have therefore chosen to explore the topic of cost-benefit analysis and
disability, with particular reference to an exceedingly influential opinion by Judge Posner.' In that case, Judge Posner understood the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act' (ADA) to call for a form of cost-benefit balancing-but he
resolved the case without seriously analyzing either costs or benefits.
In my view, the result of this failure was an incorrect outcome on
at least one of the two central questions in the case, and possibly on
both of them. But I mean to comment less on the particulars than on
the general topic of cost-benefit analysis and disability. As we shall
see, cost-benefit balancing has some important virtues in that domain.
It helps to expose the fact that a failure to accommodate a disabled
person may stem from habit or prejudice; it properly focuses attention
on the issue of potential benefits to the disabled person and potential
costs to the employer; and it disciplines intuitions that may be insufficiently anchored in reality. But at least as practiced within the judiciary, cost-benefit analysis also has potential vices. It can operate as a
vessel for unreliable intuitions rather than a way of disciplining them,
and it can fail to take account of an important aspect of discrimination, consisting of the daily humiliations of exclusion and stigmatization. Unfortunately, Judge Posner's opinion shows both of these vices.
My broader goal is to establish the importance of seeing those
daily humiliations as imposing significant costs, which must be considered as part of the inquiry into whether a requested accommodation is
"reasonable." The proper measurement of those costs poses serious
challenges. But a failure to consider them does a real disservice both
to cost-benefit analysis and to the ADA.

and made some strong points, against his long-time friend Stigler, on my behalf-less from conviction, I'm sure, than out of kindness and sympathy for a floundering and somewhat humiliated
young colleague, whom he barely knew at the time. (I bet that Posner won't remember this, and
if he does, I bet he'll deny that it happened just that way. But it did.)
2
Vande Zande v Wisconsin Department of Administration, 44 F3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir
1995) (construing the ADA's "reasonable accommodation" requirement to entail consideration
of the accommodation's cost, given the ADA's stated purpose of reducing employers' productivity losses). The decision has been cited almost 400 times. LEXIS search, Apr 2007. (Posner taught
me, among many other things, to pay careful attention to citation counts.)
3 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327, codified as
amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq (2000) (defining the failure to make "reasonable accommodations" for disabled individuals, which may include changes to facilities and job restructuring, as
one form of discrimination).
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I. THE STANDARD ANNOUNCED

A.

Facts

To begin with the facts: Lori Vande Zande suffers from a tumor
of the spinal cord, and she is paralyzed from the waist down. Her condition requires her to use a wheelchair and leads to the development
of pressure ulcers, which sometimes compel her to stay at home for
weeks at a time. Vande Zande worked for the state of Wisconsin in its
housing division, performing an array of secretarial, clerical, and administrative tasks.' Because of her disability, she requested a series of
accommodations. Two of these were refused by the state, and they
provided the basis for the litigation. One of the requested accommodations was a minor change in the kitchenettes in her building, which
were still under construction. Vande Zande objected that the sink and
the counter in the kitchenettes were at least thirty-six inches hightoo high for someone in a wheelchair. She wanted them to be lowered
to thirty-four inches, a convenient height for her.'
Vande Zande also wanted to work full time at home for a period
of eight weeks, when pressure ulcers made it impossible for her to get
to work. She suggested that the state should provide her with a desktop computer to make it possible for her to do her job from home. Her
supervisor rejected her request. Nonetheless, Vande Zande worked at
home and proved able to do so for all but 16.5 hours during the eightweek period. She took those hours from her sick leave, which she
could otherwise have carried forward. Her requested accommodation,
in light of the refusal to supply her with a computer, was the restoration of those 16.5 hours. On both points, Judge Posner, writing for the
court of appeals, ruled against her. In his view, neither accommodation
was reasonable.
B.

Law
Vande Zande v Wisconsin Department of Administration' has be-

come famous in large part for its reading of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement, which, in Judge Posner's view, requires attention to both benefits and costs. This reading was hardly inevitable. The
ADA does not define "reasonable accommodation," and another provision of the statute explicitly refers to costs. Thus the ADA permits

4

See Vande Zande v Wisconsin Department of Administration, 44 F3d 538, 543-44 (7th Cir

1995).
5
6

7

See id at 545.
See id at 544.
44 F3d 538 (7th Cir 1995).
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an employer not to yield to an employee's accommodation request if
the result would be an "undue hardship,"8 which is defined to include
"significant difficulty or expense"9 and to call for attention to the financial condition of the employer.' As Judge Posner noted, it is sensible to think that a hardship on the employer is "undue" not only in the
abstract, but also in relationship to the benefits of the accommodation." A burden on the employer might not be "undue" if it is necessary to produce large benefits for disabled workers. A lesser burden
might be "undue" if the benefits are small. And if the undue hardship
provision calls for an inquiry into both costs and benefits, it may seem
tempting to read "reasonable accommodation" in precisely the narrow
way that Vande Zande sought, as "apt or efficacious." 2 Perhaps the
express reference to "expense" in the undue hardship provision
should be taken to exclude the consideration of costs in deciding what
counts as a "reasonable accommodation."
On this view, neither benefits nor costs are part of the inquiry
into what makes an accommodation "reasonable" under the ADA.
The real question is whether the requested accommodation would be
well-tailored to the disability in question. A modest variation on Vande
Zande's cost-blind approach would make costs relevant, but only in the
restricted sense that the employer would be permitted to select the
most cost-effective means to the relevant end. Under this approach,
there would be no balancing of costs against benefits-but an accommodation would not be reasonable, and hence would not be required,
if it would be more expensive than necessary in order to accommodate the disability at issue. The employer would therefore be permitted to select the preferred means of accommodation, so long as the
selected means does what is necessary to accommodate the disability.
As a textual matter, an approach of this kind is entirely plausible.
A cost-blind interpretation of "reasonable accommodation," or an
interpretation that speaks only in terms of cost-effectiveness, would be
easy to defend, especially in view of the undue hardship provision,
which might be understood as the place where any balancing of costs
and benefits must occur. Judge Posner worked hard to establish that
balancing was required under both the undue hardship and the reasonable accommodation provisions of the statute.
Unfortunately, he spent little time with the text, history, or structure of the ADA. He did not carefully analyze the conventional
8

42 USC § 12112(b)(5)(A).

9 42 USC § 12111(10)(A).
10 42 USC § 12111(10)(B)(ii)-(iii).
11 See Vande Zande,44 F3d at 543.
12

See id at 542.
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sources of interpretation in order to establish that, in context, an accommodation is not "reasonable" if it imposes large costs and offers
small benefits. He certainly did not show that the best understanding
of the text, at the time of enactment, was that an accommodation
would be unreasonable if the costs exceeded the benefits. Instead, he
pointed to the linguistic possibility that "reasonable" softens the duty
to accommodate, and he emphasized that in the ADA, the term might
have the same meaning as in the law of negligence, where both benefits and costs are relevant.' Saying little more, Judge Posner essentially asserted that the same is true under the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA.
But is it so clear that the statutory term "reasonable," in the context of a ban on disability discrimination, should be taken in the same
way as the concept in tort law? The Supreme Court has yet to rule explicitly on the question, though it has written in a way that is consistent
with Judge Posner's approach," and though an approach akin to Judge
Posner's has come to dominate the doctrine in the lower courts."
C.

Puzzles and Valuations

Let us suppose that Judge Posner is right; certainly his conclusion
is not ruled out by the text, and it is plausibly more sensible than any
alternative. But even if so, his conclusion raises many puzzles. Must the
benefits of accommodation be turned into monetary equivalents? If so,
must courts rely on the criterion of private willingness to pay?" Should
courts ask how much a disabled person is willing to pay for the accommodation in question-even though the payment, if there is to be one,
will come from the employer? What if the employee is poor, and is not
able, and therefore is not willing, to pay much for an accommodation?
An even more puzzling question: should courts ask, not how
much a disabled person is willing to pay for an accommodation, but
how much he or she would demand in return for not being accommodated? Does willingness to pay (WTP) generate the right number, or
See id at 542-43.
See US Airways, Inc v Barnett, 535 US 391, 400-01 (2002) (rejecting the view that "reasonable" means "effective" and declaring that "a demand for an effective accommodation could
13
14

prove unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees").
15 See, for example, Gaul v Lucent Technologies Inc, 134 F3d 576, 580-81 (3d Cir 1998)
(characterizing a requested accommodation as unreasonable because it would "impose extraordinary administrative burdens" on the employer); Borkowski v Valley Central School District, 63

F3d 131, 138 (2d Cir 1995) (reasoning that cost-benefit considerations are implicit in the term
"reasonable accommodation," as used in regulations pursuant to §504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
a precursor to the ADA).
16 It is a nice question how courts might obtain such information. Perhaps contingent
valuation studies might be used. I return to this issue below.
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instead willingness to accept (WTA)? In this domain, it is entirely
predictable that there would be a large disparity between WTP and
WTA. A disabled employee may not be willing to pay a great deal to
receive some accommodations, but the same employee might demand
a lot to be deprived of them. One reason is the existence of wealth
effects: if the assignment of the right significantly affects the relative
wealth of the parties, WTP and WTA may well diverge." A more important reason is the endowment effect: because people tend to place
a higher value on goods they antecedently hold, WTA is often higher
than WTP." For lowering the sink in Vande Zande, it is plausible to
think that the plaintiff would demand a great deal to give up any entitlement that she might have, whether or not she would be willing to
pay a lot for it in the first instance.
More generally, it would seem quite odd to say that an accommodation will be deemed "reasonable" only if an employee is willing to
pay an amount that exceeds, or is at least proportional to, the costs
incurred by the employer. It might even seem odd to say that an accommodation is reasonable only if the cost to the employer is roughly
proportional to the amount that the employee would demand in return for not receiving the accommodation. But if WTP and WTA are
not relevant, what is? Should we focus on welfare as such, rather than
monetary measures, if those measures point in the wrong direction
from the standpoint of welfare?"
Judge Posner does not address these questions. He does say that
in interpreting the accommodation requirement, courts (or juries) do
not have to proceed in the same way as do economists at the Office of
Management and Budget. The costs and benefits do not "always have
to be quantified.""' (But if not always, at least sometimes, or perhaps
often, and Judge Posner did not say when not, and why not.) Moreover, an accommodation would not be "deemed unreasonable if the
17 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 50 (Aspen 6th ed 2003) ("If the value
of the right is a large fraction of the wealth of either party, where the right ends up may depend
on the initial assignment.").
18
See, for example, Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw U
L Rev 1227, 1256-59, 1262-63 (2003) (describing how the endowment effect complicates the
standard economic approach to efficient allocation and redistribution of entitlements). See
generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J Polit Econ 1325 (1990).
19 For an emphasis on the normative priority of welfare to monetized costs and benefits,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare, 1 Harv L & Policy Rev (forthcoming
2007) (questioning the use of WTP to measure welfare); Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner,
New Foundationsof Cost-Benefit Analysis 63-68 (Harvard 2006) (characterizing overall welfare
as a moral criterion, and cost-benefit analysis as a decisionmaking technique that may be useful
in maximizing overall welfare).
20
Vande Zande, 44 F3d at 542.
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cost exceeded the benefit however slightly. But, at the very least, the
cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit."" The words "at the
very least" are suggestive. They indicate the need for a serious inquiry
into both costs and benefits. But how is the assessment of "disproportionality" to be made, and to be disciplined? Perhaps Judge Posner
believes, not implausibly, that intuition will be enough to show, in contested cases, whether the costs are much higher than the benefits. But
it is easy to imagine difficult cases. As we shall see, Vande Zande is
itself an example.
In analyzing the reasonable accommodation requirement in this
way, Judge Posner carves out two independent places for consideration of costs and benefits in disability cases. First, employees "must
show that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs."" Second, the employer can show
"that upon more careful consideration the costs are excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer's
financial survival or health."2 The second idea has distinctive importance, because an employer is allowed to establish that even though
benefits and costs are proportionate, and indeed even if costs are
smaller than benefits, there is an undue hardship by virtue of a risk to
the employer's "financial survival or health."4
By ensuring such a significant overlap between "undue hardship"
and "reasonable accommodation," Judge Posner's reading might well
be challenged. Perhaps it would have been more natural to interpret
"reasonable accommodation" to require efficacy and costeffectiveness, and to leave cost-benefit balancing to the provision that
clearly invites it ("undue hardship"). But Judge Posner's interpretation is certainly plausible, and if it cannot easily be shown to be clearly
right, it is also hard to demonstrate that it is wrong.
II. THE STANDARD APPLIED
My principal complaint lies elsewhere. Recall that Vande Zande
wanted two things. She wanted the sinks to be lowered, at least on her
floor, and she wanted her 16.5 hours of sick leave back. Wisconsin
could hardly claim that yielding to those requests would represent an
undue hardship. Its only hope was to claim that these accommodations
would be unreasonable. To assess that claim, Judge Posner's opinion

21
22

23
24

Id.
Id at 543.
Id.
Id.
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requires us to know something about benefits and costs. What would
be the cost of these accommodations, and what would be the benefits?
A. Of Sinks and Stigmas
Here is what Judge Posner says. For the kitchenette, Wisconsin
would have had to spend $150 to lower the sink on Vande Zande's
floor; for all the kitchenettes, the cost of lowering the sinks would
have been $2,000 (or perhaps less)." Judge Posner recognizes that
$150 is not a lot of money, but he nonetheless rules in favor of the
state, on the ground that an employer does not have "a duty to expend
even modest amounts of money to bring about an absolute identity in
working conditions between disabled and nondisabled workers."2
But this claim is a conclusion, not an argument. If we are engaging in cost-benefit analysis, why is there no such duty if the costs are
very low and the benefits are real? Where is the disproportion between the costs and benefits? Judge Posner mentions an undeniably
relevant point, which is that Vande Zande had an available bathroom
on her floor, one that also had an easily accessible sink. For this reason, the costs of the inaccessible kitchenette sink were lower than they
might otherwise have been. If Vande Zande needed to use a sink, perhaps she should be required to use the one in the bathroom, not the
one in the kitchenette. But she responded, very reasonably, that she
wanted to use the kitchenette, not the bathroom, for such activities as
washing out her coffee cup. In any case, most employees could use the
kitchenette as well as the bathroom. Hence Vande Zande objected
that relegating her to the bathroom "stigmatized her as different and
inferior."" Removing that stigma, and the relevant inconvenience, certainly would have been beneficial to her.
Judge Posner was willing to "assume without having to decide"
that emotional barriers to full integration into the workplace "are
relevant."" (If we are engaged in cost-benefit analysis, why assume
without deciding? It seems clear that emotional barriers are real costs,
and potentially high ones.) But here, he concluded that separate but
equal was unobjectionable-even if it was not quite equal. The obvious question is, why? Recall that the cost of lowering the kitchenette
on Vande Zande's floor would be $150. Surely it was an inconvenience
to Vande Zande, at best, to have to go to the bathroom when she
wanted to use the kitchenette. Surely it was unpleasant, and possibly
25
26
27

28

Id at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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much worse, to be excluded in this way-to be unable to use a kitchenette that was generally in use. Why was the loss to Vande Zande
worth less than $150-or for that matter, less than $2,000-if she
sought to have access to all the kitchenettes in the building? Where
was the cost-benefit analysis? If the state had offered her $150 to pay
her off, would she have accepted it? Is that the right question?
These questions have broader implications. A standard difficulty
with cost-benefit analysis is that it may neglect costs and benefits that
are not easily measured." The emotional barriers to full integration
are certainly difficult to turn into monetary equivalents, or otherwise
to use for purposes of formal or informal cost-benefit analysis. But we
could imagine a contingent valuation study that would make some
progress. Imagine that wheelchair-bound people were asked: "How
much would you be willing to pay to ensure the accessibility of a sink
in a kitchenette on the floor on which you work?" One problem with
this question is that it does not seem to track the goals of the ADA,
which is not best understood to require accommodations only to the
extent that disabled people are willing to pay (enough) for them." A
better question for a contingent valuation study might be: "How much
would you have to be paid in order to accept a situation in which the
sink in the kitchenette on the floor on which you work is inaccessible?" In any case, the marginal value of a dollar will often be significantly lower for employers than for employees. Should we not be
speaking in terms of welfare instead of willingness to pay, at least
when willingness to pay is an inadequate measure of welfare?
Whatever the best answers to such questions, the analysis should
pick up emotional as well as material harm. One difficulty with the
contingent valuation questions is that the answers of a single employee might tell us too little; perhaps third parties would be benefited
by the accessible sink." But at least the answers to that question
would provide some discipline on the inclination to trivialize, or alternatively to exaggerate, the emotional or stigmatic harm of failures to
accommodate. The broader point is that even if measurement is diffi-

29
Note too that an accessible kitchenette would have created benefits for other people in
wheelchairs. On third party benefits and the ADA, see generally Elizabeth F.Emens, Integrating
Accommodation (Apr 2007) (unpublished draft, 2007).
30
For a valuable attempt to respond to this problem in the context of environmental,
health, and safety agencies, see Matthew D. Adler, FearAssessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Pricingof Fearand Anxiety, 79 Chi Kent L Rev 977, 985-89 (2004).
31 See 42 USC § 12101(b) (stating that the ADA's purpose is to "provide a clear and comprehensive mandate for the elimination of discrimination against people with disabilities").
32
See generally Emens, IntegratingAccommodation (cited in note 29).
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cult, a failure to consider that harm is not defensible.33 If the cost of a
lowering the sink were $10,000, Judge Posner's conclusion would certainly qualify as sensible. But does it so qualify when the cost was
$150?

B.

Of Telecommuting and Teamwork

Now let us turn to the question of telecommuting and sick leave.
Vande Zande had hoped that the state would allow her to work at
home, providing her with a computer for that purpose. She sought a
return of the 16.5 hours of sick leave for the work that she was unable
to do without the computer. Judge Posner rejected her claim, largely
on the broad ground that Wisconsin was under no obligation to allow
Vande Zande to telecommute at all. In his view, most jobs call for
"team work under supervision," and there would be a substantial reduction in performance if employees worked at home.m Judge Posner
recognized that with advances in technology, this "will no doubt
change."" But at the present time, employers are not required to permit disabled workers to telecommute, because "their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced." 6 Because of the inevitable and
large reduction in production, it was only in "a very extraordinary case"
that a jury could be asked to decide on the reasonableness of a refusal
to allow an employee work at home." Judge Posner added that the expected cost of the loss to Vande Zande must "surely be slight," because
it is possible that she will not ever need the 16.5 hours of sick leave."
Talk about casual empiricism! If the question is whether the costs
of the accommodation are disproportionate to the benefits, we might
want to make some kind of serious inquiry into both costs and benefits. What is the evidence that if workers telecommute, "their productivity will inevitably be greatly reduced"? In assessing benefits, do we
ask how much disabled people are willing to pay to telecommute? Or
do we ask how much they would have to be paid to be denied the
right to telecommute? More particularly, what is the evidence that
Vande Zande's own productivity was reduced? Did her productivity
fall during the eight-week period in which she worked at home? What,
in fact, is the nature of her job, such that "team work under supervi33
To be sure, it would be possible to worry over a slippery slope problem. Perhaps individually small accommodations would be expensive in the aggregate. But there was no such
problem in Vande Zande.
3
See Vande Zande, 44 F3d at 544.
35
See id.
36
Id at 545.
37
Id.
38
See id.
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sors" is required? It would seem important to ask and answer that
question to assess her request to telecommute. But Judge Posner does
not inquire.
With respect to the benefits of the accommodation, what do we
know about Vande Zande's history, such that the loss of 16.5 hours of
sick leave can be dismissed as a "slight" loss? In light of her medical
problems, a certain number of hours of sick leave would appear to be
more important to her than to most people. What, in fact, is the monetary value of 16.5 hours of sick leave? Recall that Vande Zande
wanted the use of a desktop computer for a period of eight weeks. If
she had been accommodated she would not have had to use her sick
leave. How much would it have cost Wisconsin to provide such a computer? Surely the cost would be low; perhaps it would be close to
nothing. (Perhaps the state, like many large employers, had an extra
computer in an unused office.) If we are engaging in casual empiricism, we might offer a speculation: the cost of eight weeks of use of a
computer, or of restoration of 16.5 hours of sick leave, is not "disproportionate" to the benefit. This conclusion might be strengthened if we
focus, with particularity, on Vande Zande's condition.
But I am not at all sure that Judge Posner was wrong to hold
against Vande Zande on the sick leave issue. The problem is that he
did not seriously ask the questions that, on his view, the statute required. Instead he relied on a kind of intuition, to the effect that
workers must be supervised-just as he relied on the even less helpful
(because platitudinous and irrelevant) intuition that employers need
not "expend even modest amounts of money to bring about an absolute identity in working conditions between disabled and nondisabled
workers."" In the very case in which Judge Posner established that a
kind of cost-benefit analysis lies at the heart of the requirement of
reasonable accommodation, he did not analyze costs and benefits, and
he certainly made no systematic effort to compare the two.
III. THE LESSONS
Might we draw some broader lessons?
A.

Juries
A tempting lesson is that the reasonableness of the requested ac-

commodations might well have been left to the jury-a conclusion
that would have more general implications. If the lowering of the sink
and the telecommuting questions presented problems on which rea39

See id at 546.
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sonable people might differ, perhaps the jury should have been asked
to solve them, after receiving the right instruction. In defense of this
course of action, it might be thought that the conscience of the community is properly brought to bear on the difficult question whether
the costs were disproportionate to the benefits.
On the other hand, there are serious risks here. It is possible that
the jury would have been excessively sympathetic to a disabled person, responding to her general situation rather than the particular issue. Perhaps the focus on the particular person would distort application of cost-benefit analysis, or any other test, in a way that would result in pro-plaintiff rulings that would be difficult to justify. Or perhaps the same prejudice and stereotyping that motivated the ADA
would rematerialize at the level of jury judgments. Perhaps hostility to
disabled people, or indifference to their situation, would distort the
application of cost-benefit analysis, or any other test, in a way that
would result in pro-defendant rulings that would be hard to justify.
These risks are sufficient to raise real questions about the idea that
the hardest ADA issues should be settled by juries, certainly where
cost-benefit analysis of any kind is involved.
We need to know much more about how juries handle questions
submitted to them under the ADA."o There is a great deal of room for
further conceptual and empirical work here. But in my view, the most
important lessons of Vande Zande lie elsewhere. The first involves the
value of cost-benefit analysis; the second involves its limitations.
B.

Costs, Benefits, and Intuitions

In the context of disability and elsewhere, both employers and
public officials (not excluding judges) often have exceedingly strong
intuitions, suggesting the impracticality or even absurdity of claims for
accommodation. Consider those who seek medical leave for a certain
period, or who need a special parking space, or who need a flexible
and adjusted schedule at work, or who need help in lifting heavy objects, or who are infected with some kind of disease, or who suffer
from serious anxiety problems. Many such people might seem, to
some, to be essentially incapable of working, and either before or after
the ADA, their request might be resisted because of its novelty and
because of baseless fears of contagion or nearly baseless fears of spiraling costs (and also because of an absence of empathetic identification with those who suffer from the relevant conditions). A great virtue of cost-benefit analysis, or a proportionality test, is that it puts the
4
For relevant discussion, see Brian S.Prestes, Disciplining the Americans with Disabilities
Act's Direct Threat Defense, 22 Berkeley J Empl & Labor L 409,418-22 (2001).
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resistance to its proof. It should be clear that a competent cost-benefit
analysis calls for attention to the benefits to the employee," not simply
to the employer, of requested accommodations. In making the required inquiries, perhaps employers and public officials have been
insufficiently imaginative. Having produced practices that fit the majority who are not disabled, there is a natural resistance to changing
them for the benefit of people whose basic capacities are (often
wrongly) in doubt.
There are two qualifications. First, an accommodation might be
required under the ADA even if its costs outweigh its benefits, as
Judge Posner signals in Vande Zande. (The ADA does not enact
Messrs Kaldor and Hicks's understanding of economic efficiency.")
Even if the cost of an accommodation is (say) $2,500, an employer
might be required to make the accommodation, as (for example) by
hiring personal assistants." Judge Posner calls for a rough proportionality test, not a cost-benefit test. Second, market pressures should provide some help here. If disabled people are truly able to provide benefits in excess of costs, they might well be hired. Unfortunately, there
are many obstacles to this happy story of self-correcting markets, not
least because of prejudice on the part of employers, employees, and
customers alike.
A signal virtue of some kind of weighing of costs and benefits is
that it can demonstrate that erroneous intuitions, or hostility and
prejudice, are beneath the surface. How much of a burden would have
been imposed by eight weeks of telecommuting? Why not lower sinks
to thirty-four inches, so that they can be used by people with wheelchairs -especially if the cost is usually around $150? An advantage of
an inquiry into costs and benefits, and of a comparison of the two, is
that it makes it possible to test intuitions, and practices, by reference
to reality.

41
And perhaps to employees more generally. See generally Emens, IntegratingAccommodation (cited in note 29).
42
See Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 75 (1904) (Holmes dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."). Of course Kaldor and Hicks
were two different economists, not one, but perhaps we can merge them to echo Holmes as
faithfully as possible.
43 See Borkowski v Valley CentralSchool District,63 F3d 131,142 (2d Cir 1995).
44 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination,8 Soc Phil & Policy 22,
24-29 (1991) (observing that market mechanisms do not eliminate discrimination because,
among other reasons, some customers and coworkers prefer that firms discriminate, and firms
employ stereotypes to reduce transaction costs).
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Intractable Intuitions and Stigmatic Harm

Nonetheless, Judge Posner held against Vande Zande-with a
brisk, conclusory, and inadequate analysis of the issue of telecommuting, and a brief, conclusory, and quite unconvincing analysis of the issue of lowering the sinks. This presents a bit of a puzzle, because Judge
Posner is ordinarily far more systematic with both costs and benefits.
The explanation, I believe, lies in two places, both of which require
qualification of the most ambitious claims of cost-benefit enthusiasts
in this domain (and perhaps elsewhere).
The first problem is that cost-benefit analysis might incorporate
intuitions rather than disciplining them. Without a method for calculating costs or benefits, analysts are likely to rely on their own hunches
and speculations. Recall Judge Posner's casual empiricism with respect
to telecommuting, with his suggestion that workers need to perform in
teams with supervisors, lest their productivity be "greatly" diminished.
The most sympathetic reading of this discussion is that he is, in fact,
doing a form of cost-benefit analysis, with a (reasonable) judgment
that the costs of telecommuting are likely to be high. (Put to one side
the fact that Vande Zande would have been satisfied with the restoration of her 16.5 hours of sick leave.) But there appears to be no systematic evidence on that question." Without such evidence, a judge even one sympathetic to cost-benefit analysis and to empiricism-is
likely to fall back on intuitions. Unfortunately, those intuitions may be
a product of some kind of prejudice, in the form not of bigotry, but of
an insufficiently reflective belief that standard workplace practiceseven those that come down hard on disabled people-are entirely
reasonable. If so, cost-benefit analysis, used to help determine which
accommodations are "reasonable," does not cure the underlying problem. On the contrary, it incorporates and perpetuates that problem.
The second problem is at least as fundamental. With respect to
the lowering of the sink, Vande Zande had two concerns. The first was
practical. If the goal is to wash a coffee cup, or to get a drink of water,
it is probably most pleasant and convenient to be able to use a kitchenette, not the bathroom. The second involved stigma. If most people
are able to use the sink in the kitchenette, it is not merely convenient
to be able to use that sink; worse, it is stigmatizing and in a way humiliating to have to use the bathroom instead. Judge Posner trivialized
these concerns. But for an employee, the use of the sink, in the kitch45
If a firm does in fact organize employees into supervised teams, we might think that the
firm values their physical presence. But we do not know if Vande Zande was part of any team,
and in any case the employers' practice cannot be conclusive on the question whether a requested accommodation is reasonable.
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enette on her or his floor, may be a matter of daily routine, and it is no
light thing to have to resort to the place in which employees generally
do other sorts of things (not to put too fine a point on it). To this extent, the harm in Vande Zande was expressive and symbolic.
Cost-benefit analysis cannot easily take such harms on board. But
there is no question that those harms greatly matter. People may be
willing to pay a great deal to avoid them, or demand a great deal not
to be subjected to them. (I think that in any case, their value was at
least $150 in Vande Zande.) It is plausible to say that what most matters is welfare, not willingness to pay, and the willingness to pay of
disabled workers may not give a sufficient account of the welfare effects of stigma and humiliation. There is no question that an adequate
analysis of costs and benefits would count expressive and symbolic
harms, because their welfare effects are real and sometimes large.
If an understanding of "reasonable accommodation" does not attend to expressive harms, it does a serious disservice to both adequate
cost-benefit analysis and the ADA.4' Here, I believe, is the most basic
problem with Judge Posner's opinion in Vande Zande, and it is a problem to be avoided in future treatments of the requirement of reasonable accommodation.

46

See note 3.
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